EZ, Plaintiff, v.	SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY GLOUCESTER COUNTY DOCKET NO.: GLO-L-377-23
DEPTFORD TOWNSHIP BOARD OF EDUCATION and TODD REITZEL in his official capacity as School Business Administrator/Board Secretary,	FINAL ORDER
Defendants.	

This matter having come before the Court on this 23rd day of May 2023 as an Order to Show Cause, with Jamie Epstein, Esq., appearing virtually for the Plaintiff and Albert K. Marmero, Esq., appearing virtually for the Defendants.

IT IS on this 23rd day of May 2023 ORDERED as follows:

- 1. Plaintiff's request for a judgment ordering Defendants to disclose copies of all documents and information requested in Plaintiff's February 8, 2023, OPRA request is GRANTED.
- 2. Defendant shall turn over the requested records to Plaintiff no later than Friday, June 2, 2023.
- 3. Defendant shall make all appropriate redactions, if any, and provide an indexing of the reasons for redaction.
- 4. Plaintiff is the prevailing party and is entitled to all reasonable counsel fees.
- 5. Plaintiff shall submit a certification of services no later than Tuesday, June 6, 2023.
- 6. Defendant shall submit a response, if any, no later than Tuesday, June 13, 2023.
- 7. The return date for the counsel fee determination shall be <u>Tuesday, June 20, 2023, at</u> <u>2:00 p.m. via Zoom</u>.

B<u>enjamin C. Telsey, AJS</u>C

Hon. Benjamin C. Telsey, A.J.S.C.

	SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION, CIVIL PART CAMDEN COUNTY, NEW JERSEY DOCKET NO. 000377-23
	APP. DIV. NO.
E.Z.,	:
	:
Plaintiff(s),	
ν.	: OF : RETURN ON ORDER
•	TO SHOW CAUSE
DEPTFORD BOARD OF	:
EDUCATION and TODD	:
REITZEL, in his	:
official capacity as	:
School Business	:
Administrator/Board Secretary,	•
	:
Defendant(s).	:
	:
Place:	Gloucester County Courthouse 1 North Broad Street
	Woodbury, NJ 08096
Date:	May 23, 2023
BEFORE :	
THE HONORABLE BENJ	MAMIN C. TELSEY, J.S.C.
TRANSCRIPT ORDERED BY:	
JAMIE EPSTEIN, ESQ). (Jamie Epstein Law)
APPEARANCES :	
	(India Enctain Int)
JAMIE EPSTEIN, ESQ	_
Attorney for the P	_
Attorney for the P	Plaintiff
Attorney for the P ALBERT K. MARMERO,	Plaintiff ESQ. (Marmero Law)
Attorney for the P	Plaintiff ESQ. (Marmero Law)
Attorney for the F ALBERT K. MARMERO, Attorney for the D BRI	Plaintiff ESQ. (Marmero Law) Defendants ENDA BOULDEN
Attorney for the F ALBERT K. MARMERO, Attorney for the D BRI AUTOMATED 1	Plaintiff ESQ. (Marmero Law) Defendants ENDA BOULDEN TRANSCRIPTION SERVICES
Attorney for the F ALBERT K. MARMERO, Attorney for the D BRI AUTOMATED T	Plaintiff ESQ. (Marmero Law) Defendants ENDA BOULDEN TRANSCRIPTION SERVICES P.O. Box 1582
Attorney for the F ALBERT K. MARMERO, Attorney for the D BRI AUTOMATED T Laurel	Plaintiff ESQ. (Marmero Law) Defendants ENDA BOULDEN TRANSCRIPTION SERVICES P.O. Box 1582 Springs, New Jersey
Attorney for the F ALBERT K. MARMERO, Attorney for the E BRI AUTOMATED T Laurel	Plaintiff ESQ. (Marmero Law) Defendants ENDA BOULDEN TRANSCRIPTION SERVICES P.O. Box 1582 Springs, New Jersey (856) 784-4276
Attorney for the F ALBERT K. MARMERO, Attorney for the D BRI AUTOMATED T Laurel ((856)	Plaintiff ESQ. (Marmero Law) Defendants ENDA BOULDEN TRANSCRIPTION SERVICES P.O. Box 1582 Springs, New Jersey

THE COURT: Okay. So I do agree with Mr.

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Marmero that it's unfortunate that his clients did not consult with him earlier on in this process. This was just not the way requests are supposed to be handled by any stretch of the imagination. And I'm surprised that defendants didn't consider just trying to resolve this prior to the presentation today. But regardless, the facts in this case are that plaintiff is a resident of Audubon, which is in Camden County. And plaintiff E.Z. is a parent of a student within the New Jersey school system. Defendant Deptford Township Board of Education is the municipal body and is a political subdivision of New Jersey. The Board of Education is a public agency as defined by the Open Public Records Act and its principal place of business is in Gloucester County, Deptford, New Jersey.

Plaintiff commences this action under OPRA 47:1A-1, seeking records withheld by the Board of Education. Plaintiff has a child who was enrolled in the District's middle school during the 2022-2023 school year. Plaintiff made requests on multiple occasions for copies of records, including the child's student records and copies of documents accessible to the general public, such as the Districts forms and Plaintiff's requests were each denied by the policies. Board of Education.

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$1 \\ 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 13 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \\$	Plaintiff attempted to enroll in Genesis, an online program that grants parents access to their child's attendance, grades, assignments, code of conduct incidents, and other records and information relevant to the child's enrollment in the school within the District. Plaintiff was denied the ability to enroll in the program. Months later the Board of Education explained to plaintiff that the request and their Genesis access was denied because plaintiff is not the legal guardian of the child. Plaintiff requested copies of any legal documents demonstrating the basis for this and did not were denied that access as well. On October 29th plaintiff filed an OPRA request to obtain copies of documents and records the Board of Education did not provide. And on February 8th, after several months and with no response to the plaintiff's request, plaintiff filed a new OPRA request requesting one, two, three, four, five, six, seven eight separate items. To follow up on the request, plaintiff contacted the and when plaintiff did not
22 23 24 25	receive any response to the subsequent request, plaintiff attempted to try to get these documents by contacting the superintendent. And on March 17th, the superintendent I believe it's the superintendent,

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Mr. Kanauss, responded to plaintiff, explaining that the OPRA request for the access to the child's records were denied because plaintiff is not the legal guardian of the child. Plaintiff requests copies of any and all Court order stating that and was denied that access as well. And accordingly, the subsequent OPRA request was filed.
8	As we all know, OPRA provides for the
9	intention of providing broad public access to
10	information about how (indiscernible) government is, so
11	that citizens and the media can play a watchful role in
12	curbing wasteful government spending and guarding
13	against corruption and misconduct. A public agency
14	seeking to restrict the public's right of access to
15	government records must provide specific, reliable
16	evidence sufficient to meet a statutorily recognized
17	basis for confidentiality. Absent such a showing, a
18	citizen's right of access cannot be interfered with.
19	If the Court determines that access has been improperly
20 21	denied, the access sought should be granted.
22	When a response to an OPRA request, agencies are required to disclose only identifiable governmental
23	records not that are not otherwise exempt. As to
24	this request, the first objection made was to the
25	timeliness of the OPRA request and the filing of the
10	ermorrises of the offer requests and the fifting of the

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(indiscernible) complaint. That's been withdrawn, so I don't need to address this.
The next group of requests are the PDF copies
which are 1, 2, and 4 of the February 8th request. Defendants assert that no policies or documents
relative to these items exist as far as items 1 and 2.
That may be the case, but the plaintiffs strike that the defendants and I may have misspoke before
the defendants fail to certify that or provide any
response to the fact that those requests those requested items did not exist. So defendant is clearly
in violation of case law with regards to the
requirements to do so. As to item number 4, that item did in fact
exist and there was just simply no response. So
clearly, the defendants are in violation of their OPRA obligations under the request number 4.
As to the other more substantial and broad
issue here, the defendants seem to suggest in their first of all, to be clear, there's no response to any
of the requests, but in the pleadings, once the
litigation was filed, defendants seem to draw a distinction that the plaintiff in this case was not a
legal guardian so was not otherwise entitled to those
records. That distinction of a legal guardian is

1 really a red herring in this case. 2 What's clear is that the plaintiff is a 3 And what's not disputed which we established parent. 4 at the beginning of legal argument is that a parent is 5 entitled to the educational records of their child. 6 The defendants seems to have argued -- seems to be 7 arguing that there is an exemption even if the -- it's 8 hard for me to put in words because, frankly, the 9 argument doesn't make any sense. Defendant seems to be 10 arguing that there is an exemption under FERPA, which 11 is an identifiable -- potentially an identifiable 12 exemption under OPRA, where FERPA indicates that a --13 its argument is that a non-parent is not entitled to 14 these items. But this is a parent, so I don't really 15 understand that argument at all. 16 I think there's a more broader general 17 argument being advanced by defendants that they don't 18 always know whether a person is a parent, so the 19 exemption would apply under FERPA. You know, that's 20 not before this Court. What's before this Court is the 21 fact that it's not disputed that the person who made 22 this OPRA request was the parent. So that's a non-23 disputed issue. 24 So what the Court is faced with is a parent 25 who is requesting educational records of their child

23 1 which was denied by the defendant by not responding and 2 then ultimately in briefing denied in some -- based 3 upon some general argument that FERPA could apply if 4 It's sort of a circular it's not a non-parent. 5 argument that really doesn't make sense here. The 6 plaintiffs -- or the defendants have the burden of 7 proof to establish that there's an exemption. There's 8 exemption that applies to this situation. Clearly, Mom 9 is requesting educational documentation of her child. 10 The one issue that did come up in the 11 briefing was that there was an order and that order 12 perhaps suggested in the briefing to this Court that there was language in that order that would have 13 limited the plaintiff's access to those educational 14 15 records or even that perhaps her parental rights were 16 terminated. So as a result of that and that being a 17 critical issue, the Court requested with consent of the 18 parties -- which I appreciate their consent -- to 19 review that order in advance. Because if her --20 plaintiff's parental rights are terminated or if 21 there's some language in the order that said she was 22 not entitled to educational records, then defendant's 23 argument would make sense. 24 That's not what the order said. The order 25 simply indicated -- just established a custodial

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	arrangement a visitation arrangement for the parties. That's it. There's no language limiting the plaintiff's access to educational records. And there's nothing suggesting that the plaintiff was not a parent. So none of that applied here. So for all those reasons, the defendants fail to establish their burden for that an exemption applies to OPRA under this case.
8 9	There was also a request for release of the
10	Court order in this case. Defendants seem to make two
11	arguments. Number one, they suggest that they're not
12	entitled to the order because of the whole parental
13	issue that I commented on. That clearly doesn't apply
14	here. Next, the defendants indicate a 138-3(d) which
15	is a Court rule exemption to those records. There's 20
16	subsections under (d). Defendants never point to the
17	subsection that they suggest applies. I reviewed that.
18	I didn't see any subsection that says that a party is
19	not entitled to a Court order. But again, it's not
20 21	this Court's obligation to try to fit a round peg in a
22	square hole and figure out what subsection applies. There's no reference in other than just a broad
23	reference at 138-3(d).
24	So the Court doesn't find that applies
25	either. So for all of the reasons places on the
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$1 \\ 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ 10 \\ 11 \\ 12 \\ 14 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 20 \\ 21 \\ 22 \\ 24 \\ 24 \\ 10 \\ 10 \\ 10 \\ 10 \\ 21 \\ 22 \\ 24 \\ 24 \\ 10 \\ 10 \\ 10 \\ 10 \\ 10 \\ 10 \\ 10 \\ 1$	<pre>record, the Court finds that the plaintiff is entitled to the requested records. Those records should be turned over to the plaintiff in a reasonable period of time. I'll just use the language "reasonable period of time," unless Mr. Epstein is asking that I put a specific date in there. And I'll hear from him on that. Also, as a result of this order today, the Court finds that the plaintiff, who's clearly the prevailing party is entitled to counsel fees. These counsel fees should specifically include the time necessary to prepare for oral argument today and appear at oral argument today. So, Mr. Epstein, I'm going to ask that you submit within two weeks of today's date a certification of services. Mr. Marmero, you can submit a response, if you choose to do so, within one week after that. And I'm going to give this a return date that we'll place that I'll identify as let's two weeks will be so the certification services will be June 6th. The response will be June 13th. The return date barring scheduling conflicts would be June 20th at two o'clock. I'm hopeful that counsel can UNIDENTIFIED COUNSEL: Yeah.</pre>
24 25	THE COURT: come to some agreement on counsel fees and avoid any further appearance. But if

you can't, we'll keep that as the control date.